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This paper studies the security of a secure communication scheme based on two discrete-time
intermittently-chaotic systems synchronized via a common random driving signal. Some security
defects of the scheme are revealed: 1) the key space can be remarkably reduced; 2) the decryption
is insensitive to the mismatch of the secret key; 3) the key-generation process is insecure against
known/chosen-plaintext attacks. The first two defects mean that the scheme is not secure enough
against brute-force attacks, and the third one means that an attacker can easily break the cryp-
tosystem by approximately estimating the secret key once he has a chance to access a fragment
of the generated keystream. Yet it remains to be clarified if intermittent chaos could be used for
designing secure chaotic cryptosystems.
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In [1], a new method of generating pseudo-
random keys from discrete-time chaotic systems
using a noise signal was proposed for designing
secure communication schemes. In this method,
the noise signal serves as a common driving sig-
nal to synchronize two dynamical systems and
forces them to be intermittently chaotic, ensuring
that they generate the same pseudo-random keys
for both encryption and decryption. This paper
studies the security of the above-referred secure
communication scheme and points out its severe
security defects, showing that the scheme is inse-
cure against both inexpensive brute-force attacks
and known/chosen-plaintext attacks. At present,
it is not yet clear whether or not the existence of
intermittent periodicity is always an essential de-
fect of this kind of secure chaotic cryptosystems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of using chaos to design analog secure com-
munication systems and digital ciphers has provoked
a great deal of research efforts since the early 1990s
[2, 3, 4]. Meanwhile, security analysis of various proposed
chaotic cryptosystems also attracts increasing attention,
and some chaotic cryptosystems have been found insecure
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36].
Most analog chaos-based secure communication systems
are based on chaos synchronization technique [37], where
the receiver (response or slave) chaotic system synchro-
nizes with the transmitter (drive or master) system via
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a signal transmitted over a public channel. After the
chaos synchronization is achieved, the plain-signal can
be recovered in different ways corresponding to different
structures of the encryption algorithms. According to
the method used for encrypting the plain-signal, there
are four common types of chaos synchronization-based
encryption structures [2, 3, 38]: chaotic masking, chaotic
switching (or chaotic shift keying - CSK), chaotic mod-
ulation and inverse system approach. Since many early
chaos-based secure communication systems are found in-
secure against various attacking methods, some counter-
measures have been proposed in the hope of enhancing
the security: 1) using more complex dynamical systems,
such as hyperchaotic systems or multiple cascaded het-
erogeneous chaotic systems [39]; 2) adding traditional ci-
phers into the whole cryptosystem [40]; 3) introducing a
discrete-time impulsive signal instead of a continuous sig-
nal to realize synchronization [2, 41]. The first counter-
measure has been found not secure enough against some
attacks [15, 18, 23, 29], and some security defects of the
second have also been reported [22], but the last one has
not yet been broken to date.
In [42], as a new way to enhance the security of
chaos-based secure communications, a new synchroniza-
tion method was proposed for multiple discrete-time dy-
namical systems driven by a common random signal. Dy-
namical systems synchronized in this way work in inter-
mittent chaotic states, i.e., alternatively switching be-
tween chaotic and periodic regimes. In [1], this new syn-
chronization method was used to construct a new secure
communication scheme, in which the two synchronized
intermittently-chaotic systems generate the same pseudo-
random keystream. The pseudo-random keystream is
then used for encrypting the plaintext at the transmitter
end, and for decrypting the ciphertext at the receiver, via
a piecewise linear encryption/decryption function origi-
nally used in [40]. The core of this secure communication
scheme is the key-generation process based on the two
discrete-time intermittently-chaotic systems. In [1], it
2was claimed that the key-generation process is very sen-
sitive to the mismatch of the secret key so it is very secure
against attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this secure
communication scheme is the first and the only one based
on intermittent chaos, and it has not been cryptanalyzed
before.
This paper analyzes the security of the above-referred
secure communication scheme, and reveals some of its
security defects: 1) some secret parameters (i.e., sub-
keys) can be eliminated or directly estimated from the
ciphertext, so that the available key-space is drasti-
cally reduced; 2) the decryption is largely insensitive
to the mismatch of the secret key; 3) the chaos-based
key-generation process is insecure against known/chosen-
plaintext attacks. The first two defects mean that
this communication scheme is not secure enough against
brute-force attacks, and the third defect means that an
attacker can easily break the cryptosystem by approxi-
mately estimating the secret key once he has a chance
to get access to a fragment of the generated keystream.
It is not clear, at this stage, whether or not intermittent
chaos is always unsuitable for designing secure chaotic
cryptosystems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, a brief introduction to the secure commu-
nication scheme under study is given. In Sec. III, crypt-
analysis is shown in detail along with experimental veri-
fication. The last section concludes the paper.
II. THE SECURE COMMUNICATION SCHEME
The secure communication system proposed in [1] is
described as follows.
The transmitter system is
z
(1)
t+1 = tanh(µ(az
(1)
t + ut))− tanh(µbz
(1)
t ), (1)
and the receiver system is
z
(2)
t+1 = tanh(µ(az
(2)
t + ut))− tanh(µbz
(2)
t ), (2)
where µ, a, b are positive parameters. The synchroniza-
tion between these two discrete-time dynamical systems
is realized via a common driving signal,
ut = φ(rˆt) = φ(rt + µt) =
{
A, rˆt < θ,
B, rˆt ≥ θ,
(3)
where rt is a random telegraph signal (RTS) given by
rt =
{
α, with probability p,
β, with probability 1− p,
(4)
and µt is noise introduced by the channel during the
transmission of rt (note that µt may be different at
the sender and the receiver ends). To facilitate the fol-
lowing descriptions, without loss of generality, assume
0 < α < β and 0 < A < B. Then, a typical value of
θ is (α + β)/2, which is the middle value of the interval
[α, β]1.
In the above secure communication scheme, the RTS
signal rt randomly switches the dynamics of the two
discrete-time maps (1) and (2) by changing the value
of one control parameter, ut. According to [1, Sec.II],
when µ, a and b are set to make the two maps chaotic
for ut = 0, increasing ut will cause the maps to go into
the periodic regime. Thus, by choosing the values of A
and B properly, the two synchronized systems can be
configured to work in the chaotic regime for ut = A and
in the periodic regime for ut = B, respectively. That
is, the two maps are not fully chaotic, but intermittently
chaotic, under the control of the random signal ut. In
this case, the two systems can reach synchronization af-
ter a limited number of iterations if p is not too large
[42]. According to our experiments, p ≤ 0.8 is required
when µ = 5, a = 1, b = 1, A = α = 0.02, B = β = 0.2
(the default values used in [1]).
The encryption procedure is composed of two processes:
the key-generation process and the encryption process.
Similarly, the decryption procedure is composed of the
key-generation process and the decryption process. Both
procedures can be described as follows.
• The key-generation process : the transmitter
and the receiver generate two pseudo-random
keystreams, {K1t = z
(1)
t } and {K
2
t = z
(2)
t }, respec-
tively.
• Assuming the plain-signal is mt and the transmit-
ted cipher-signal is st, the encryption procedure is
st = Ψ
n
(
mt,K
1
t
)
, where Ψ(x, y) is a piecewise lin-
ear encryption function originally used in [40]:
Ψ(x, y) =

(x+ y) + 2w, −3w ≤ x+ y ≤ −w,
(x+ y), −w ≤ x+ y ≤ w,
(x+ y)− 2w, w ≤ x+ y ≤ 3w.
(5)
As mentioned in [1], Ψn(x, y) can be replaced by
other encryption functions.
• Assuming the received cipher-signal is sˆt = st+ δt,
where δt is the noise introduced in the transmission
channel, and the recovered plain-signal is mˆt, the
decryption procedure is mˆt = Ψ
n
(
sˆt,−K
2
t
)
.
The secret key of the key-generation process is
{µ, a, b, A,B, θ} and the secret key of the encryption func-
tion (5) is {n,w}.
An enhanced key-generation process was also proposed
to improve the security of the generated key-stream: use
1 Note that Eq. (9) in [1], θ = α+ (α+ β)/2, is wrong, since α+
(α + β)/2 > β when α < β < 2α. In fact, under the assumption
that noise µt has zero-mean and symmetric distribution [1], the
best value of θ should naturally be the middle value of [α, β].
3k (k > 1) different systems instead of a single one at both
ends, and take the maximal value of the outputs of all k
systems at each time instant to determine K1t and K
2
t .
III. CRYPTANALYSIS
Before starting to analyze the security of the above-
referred secure communication scheme, some security
guidelines are reviewed. Following the well-known Kerck-
hoffs’ principle in cryptology [43], the security of a cryp-
tosystem should rely on the secret key only, which means
that an attacker knows all details about the cryptosys-
tem except for the secret key. For this secure communi-
cation scheme to be analyzed, the following assumptions
are made:
• the attacker does not know the secret keys
{µ, a, b, A,B, θ} and {n,w}.
• the attacker exactly knows Eqs. (1) to (5);
• the attacker has full control on the channel over
which the cipher-signals st, sˆt and the common
driving signals rt, rˆt are transmitted, where “full
control” means that the attacker not only can pas-
sively observe the transmitted signals but also can
actively change the transmitted signals st and rt.
Actually, in some special scenarios, it is possible for an
attacker to get some useful information or even inten-
tionally choose some information from the transmitter
and/or the receiver. As a result, from the cryptograph-
ical point of view, to provide a high level of security,
a cryptosystem should be secure enough against all the
following four attacks (listed from the hardest to the eas-
iest):
• the ciphertext-only attack - the attacker can only
get ciphertexts and other publicly-transmitted in-
formation (such as the common driving signal in
the scheme under discussion);
• the known-plaintext attack - in addition to some
basic information, the attacker can get some plain-
texts and the corresponding ciphertexts;
• the chosen-plaintext attack - in addition to some
basic information, the attacker can choose some
plaintexts and get the corresponding ciphertexts;
• the chosen-ciphertext attack - in addition to some
basic information, the attacker can choose some ci-
phertexts and get the corresponding plaintexts.
The last two attacks, which seem to seldom occur in
practice, are feasible in some real applications [43, Sec.
1.1] and has become much more common in today’s net-
worked world. In the following, it will be pointed out
that the secure communication system under study is
not secure enough against the first three attacks.
This paper imposes a simple assumption, µt ≡ 0 and
δt ≡ 0, to make the discussion of cryptanalysis easier.
Note that removing the two noise signals has no in-
fluence on the security analysis of the studied scheme.
Also, µt and δt can be directly removed in some applica-
tions, for example, when the whole system is constructed
digitally in computers and the transmission channels
are digital storage media (such as floppy disks, hard
disks, CDs, flash-memory disks, etc.) or networks com-
pletely digitized with some error-correction mechanisms.
In addition, one generally simulates secure communica-
tion schemes via some mathematical softwares, such as
Matlabr, where no channel errors occur.
A. Reduction of the key space
The simplest attack to a cryptosystem is known as the
brute-force attack consisting of exhaustively searching all
possible keys. The complexity of such a simple attack is
determined by the size of the key space, i.e., the number
of all valid keys. From the cryptographical point of view,
the size of the key space should not be smaller than 2100
to provide a high level of security [43]. In this section, it
is to point out that the studied communication system is
not secure enough since its key space is not sufficiently
large, which is caused by the key space reduction and low
sensitivity of decryption to the secret key.
The secret key of the key-generation process
{µ, a, b, A,B, θ} can be immediately reduced to {aµ =
µa, bµ = µb,Aµ = µA,Bµ = µB, θ} by rewriting the
chaotic equation as follows:
zt+1 = tanh (aµzt + uµ,t)− tanh (bµzt) , (6)
where
uµ,t = µφ(rˆt) =
{
µA = Aµ, rˆt < θ,
µB = Bµ, rˆt ≥ θ.
(7)
In addition, as stated in [1], this secure communication
scheme is not sensitive to θ. Actually, θ depends only
on the distribution of the noise signal µt and under most
conditions θ = (α+ β)/2 can work well. Therefore, from
the cryptographical point of view, θ should not be in-
cluded in the secret key. Thus, the secret key of the
key-generation process is reduced to {aµ, bµ, Aµ, Bµ}.
The secret key of the encryption function (5) was
claimed to be {n,w} in [1]. Since the range of the cipher-
signal st is [−w,w], one can set w be the maximum of
|st| in a long period of time. This means that w can
be removed and the secret key is further reduced to {n}
only.
In the following, only {aµ, bµ, Aµ, Bµ, n} will be used
as the secret parameters of the secure communication
scheme for further analysis.
4B. The “plausible” sensitivity of the decryption
error to parameter mismatch
In [1], some experiments were reported to show that
the secure communication scheme is very sensitive to
parameter mismatch: even a small difference of order
10−8 in µ, α or β will cause a relatively large decryp-
tion error (see Fig. 6 of [1]). Assuming such a sen-
sitivity holds equally for all the four secret parameters
{aµ, bµ, Aµ, Bµ}, one can see that the size of the key
space of the key-generation process will not be less than
(108)4 = 1032 ≈ 2106, which is cryptographically large.
However, our numerical study shows that the data given
in Fig. 6 of [1] are wrong, so they reached a false conclu-
sion on the sensitivity to the secret key in decryption. In
fact, we found that the sensitivity is mainly dependent
on the values of p and n, and that this sensitivity is too
weak to provide a high level of security when n is not too
large (n has to be as large as 232 as discussed below).
At first, let us revisit the case experimentally studied
in Sec. III-C of [1], where the key2 is {aµ = 25, bµ =
5, Aµ = 0.05, Bµ = 1, n = 71}, w = 1, and the plain-
signal is mt = 0.8 sin(2pit/4). In [1], it was not explicitly
mentioned what the sampling frequency is. Here, we as-
sume that the plain-signal is sampled at a frequency of
100 Hz. When the decryption key is {a′µ = aµ(1+δ), b
′
µ =
bµ(1 + δ), A
′
µ = Aµ(1 + δ), B
′
µ = Bµ(1 + δ)}, where
δ = 0.001 is the relative parameter mismatch3, the de-
crypted plain-signal mˆt and its spectrum are shown in
Fig. 1 (for comparison, the waveform and spectrum of
mt are also plotted). One can see that the plain-signal
is decrypted with only a little intermittent noise, which
means that the sensitivity of the encryption scheme to
the parameter mismatch is very weak. Further exper-
iments show that with a larger δ it is still possible to
approximately recover the plain-signal mt, at least in
the frequency domain (see Fig. 2 for the decryption
plain-signal mˆt when δ = 1). What does δ = 1 mean?
It means that even a secret key satisfying a′µ = 2aµ,
b′µ = 2bµ, A
′
µ = 2Aµ and B
′
µ = 2Bµ can be used to ap-
proximately recover the sinusoidal signal. To observe the
relationship between the recovery errors and the value of
δ, defining the decryption error ratio (in power energy)
as DER =
(∑
t(m
′
t −mt)
2
)
/
∑
tm
2
t , 17 different values
of δ have been tested and one experimental result4 is
shown in Fig. 3. The results imply that any key satisfying
aµ/2 ≤ a
′
µ ≤ 2aµ, bµ/2 ≤ b
′
µ ≤ 2bµ, Aµ/2 ≤ A
′
µ ≤ 2Aµ
and Bµ/2 ≤ B
′
µ ≤ 2Bµ can be used to approximately re-
cover the sinusoidal signal. Roughly speaking, the closer
the key to the real key, the smaller the recovery errors
2 Note that the value of b shown in the caption of Fig. 5 of [1]
should be 1.0, not 5.0. In fact, the default secret parameters
used in [1] are always µ = 5, a = 5, b = 1 (5/5/1-oscillator).
3 Since Aµ may be very small in practice, the relative mismatch is
more suitable for analysis than its absolute counterpart.
4 All experiments show similar results, so only one is plotted here.
will incline to be. Clearly, this will cause fatal collapse
of the key space and so dramatically reduce the security
of the scheme. Thus, one question arises: how can one
explain such an undesirable insensitivity?
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0
1
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FIG. 1: The waveforms of the original plain-signal mt =
0.8 sin(2pit/4) and the decrypted signal mˆt, and their relative
power spectra, when δ = 0.001, p = 0.3 and n = 71.
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FIG. 2: The decrypted plain-signal mˆt and its relative power
spectrum, when mt = 0.8 sin(2pit/4), δ = 1, p = 0.3 and
n = 71.
In our opinion, the reason behind this interesting phe-
nomenon should be attributed to the fact that the in-
volved dynamical systems show chaotic behaviors with
a probability less than p [42]. When p < 0.5, the peri-
odic behavior will dominate the evolution ofKt, therefore
Kt will not be so sensitive to parameter mismatch in an
average sense, as expected in a fully chaotic regime. Ob-
serving the difference between K2t and K
1
t , shown in Fig.
4, the above explanation can be understood conceptually.
Next, let us find out how the sensitivity changes as p
increases. Following the above qualitative explanation on
the low sensitivity of the decryption error for p = 0.3, it
can be expected that the chaotic behavior occurs more
510−8 10−7 10−6 10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
101
δ
D
E
R
FIG. 3: The experimental relationship between DER and the
value of δ, when p = 0.3 and n = 71.
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FIG. 4: The two difference signals, K2t − K
1
t (top) and
Ψn(0, K2t ) − Ψ
n(0, K1t ) (bottom), when δ = 0.001, p = 0.3
and n = 71.
and more frequently as p increases, so that the decryption
error will become more and more sensitive to parameter
mismatch. Taking p = 0.7 as an example, experiments
show that the decryption error when δ = 0.001 is similar
to the case when p = 0.3 and δ = 1 (see Figs. 5 and 6 for
the experimental results and compare them with Figs. 1
and 4). Further experiments have been carried out to
check on some other values of p, and the results are sum-
marized in Table I. Note that the synchronization will
become too slow or even impossible when p > 0.8 [42].
From the data listed in Table I, it is clear that even for
the maximal value of p, i.e., p = 0.8, the sensitivity of
the decryption error to parameter mismatch is not suf-
ficiently high. To avoid such an insensitivity, one has
to ensure the dynamical system evolves in the chaotic
regime in all time, i.e., to set p = 1. However, in this
case the synchronization will become absolutely impos-
sible [42]. This seems to imply that the proposed se-
cure communication scheme based on intermittent chaos
is always insecure from the cryptographical point of view
[43]. Yet, it remains to theoretically clarify whether or
not the above claim is right for all cryptosystems based
on intermittently chaotic systems.
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FIG. 5: The decrypted plain-signal mˆt and its relative power
spectrum, when mt = 0.8 sin(2pit/4), δ = 0.001, p = 0.7 and
n = 71.
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t
FIG. 6: The two difference signals, K2t − K
1
t (top) and
Ψn(0,K2t ) − Ψ
n(0,K1t ) (bottom), when δ = 0.001, p = 0.7
and n = 71.
TABLE I: The largest insensitive parameter mismatch δmax
with respect to p.
p 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 > 0.8
δmax 1 1 1 10
−2 10−2 10−3 10−3 10−4 impractical
Another fact one can find from Figs. 4 and 6 is that the
difference between K2t and K
1
t is significantly magnified
by the encryption function (5). By rewriting the n-fold
encryption function as Ψn(x, y) = Ψ′(x+ ny), where
Ψ′(x) =
{
((x + w) mod 2w)− w, ((x/w) mod 4) 6= 3,
w, ((x/w) mod 4) = 3,
one can easily find that such a magnification is mainly
determined by the multiplication factor n: the larger the
n is, the larger the magnification will be. This suggests
that the sensitivity of Kt is improved by using a larger
value of n. However, n has to be very large to increase
the sensitivity to an acceptable level of security since the
magnification spreading rate here is linear. For example,
when p = 0.3, to make the actual sensitivity be in the
6order of 10−8, as reported in [1], n > 232 is required.
Figs. 7 and 8 show the decryption results when n = 231
and n = 232, respectively. The sinusoid signal mt can
still be distinguished when n = 231 whereas the spectral
peak of mt at 0.25 Hz is suppressed when n = 2
32 (but
the signal is still partially visible). This result actually
implies:
• The decryption is largely insensitive not only to the
mismatch of the secret key of the key-generation
process, but also to the secret key of the encryption
function (5), so brute-force attacks to the whole
chaotic cryptosystem are quite easy.
• The security of the studied communication scheme
is ensured by the encryption function Ψn(x, y), not
by the chaos-based key-generation process. In other
words, if the key-generation process is directly used
as a keystream generator to encrypt the plain-
signal, the cryptosystem will be rather weak. This
means that the chaos-based key-generation process
is irrelevant to the security of the studied secure
communication scheme.
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FIG. 7: The decrypted plain-signal mˆt and its relative power
spectrum, when mt = 0.8 sin(2pit/4), δ = 10
−8, p = 0.3 and
n = 231.
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FIG. 8: The decrypted plain-signal mˆt and its relative power
spectrum, when mt = 0.8 sin(2pit/4), δ = 10
−8, p = 0.3 and
n = 232.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the experimental
data given in [1] are actually wrong. When p = 0.3, n =
71, our experiments show that the power energy of the
decryption error is much smaller than the one shown in
Fig. 6 of [1]. For example, when δ = 0.001, the power
energy is only 0.093086. It is found that the data for
p = 1− 0.3 = 0.7 agree with Fig. 6 of [1]. We guess that
the authors of [1] mistook the value of p.
C. Breaking the key-generation process by
known/chosen-plaintext attacks
In a known/chosen-plaintext attack, the attacker can
get the plain-signal mt, so it is possible to find an ap-
proximate key {aµ, bµ, Aµ, Bµ} by searching the whole
key space. Here, we assume that the value of n is known.
As discussed above, the decryption error is not sensi-
tive to the mismatch of {aµ, bµ, Aµ, Bµ}, so the searching
complexity will be small practically. Assuming that the
range of the four secret parameters are aµ ∈ [12, 50], bµ ∈
[2.5, 9.5], Aµ ∈ [0.02, 0.1], Bµ ∈ [0.5, 2], respectively, the
searching steps are chosen as δaµ = δbµ = 1, δAµ =
0.01, δBµ = 0.1, respectively
5. Note that the range and
the searching step of bµ are intentionally chosen to make
sure that the real value bµ = 5 cannot be visited in the
current searching precision, which is common in real at-
tacks since the real values of the secret parameters are all
unknown. In this case, the number of all searched keys is
44928 ≈ 215.4, which is very small even for a PC. For each
guessed key, the decryption error ratio in power energy
(DER, see the previous subsection) is calculated. Using
Matlabr 6.1, about 4.37 hours is consumed on a PC with
a 1.8GHz Pentiumr 4 CPU and 256MB memory to test
all 44,928 keys. The minimal DER occurs when the key
is {a˜µ = 27, b˜µ = 5.5, A˜µ = 0.06, B˜µ = 1}. The DER
with respect to {aµ, bµ} and {Aµ, Bµ} are shown in Figs.
9 and 10, respectively, from which one can see that the
minimum is sufficiently distinguishable from other val-
ues in the current searching precision. Compared with
the real key {aµ = 25, bµ = 5, Aµ = 0.05, Bµ = 1}, such
a key is good enough to get an acceptable decryption per-
formance (see Fig. 11). Of course, by doing more rounds
of searching in smaller ranges with smaller steps, it is
easy to get a more accurate estimation of the secret key.
Moreover, since the DER function can be continuous, it
may be possible to use some local minimization scheme
to hasten the search further.
In the following, we revisit the security problem stud-
ied in Sec. III.C of [1]: “how secure is the key generator
if the intruder has access to a key fragment, Kt, and the
corresponding synchronizing signal, Rt, t1 ≤ t ≤ t2?”
When the n-fold encryption function Ψn(x, y) is replaced
by another encryption function that is invertible with
respect to Kt, such as the XOR operation widely used
5 In [1], these ranges are not explicitly given, so we just choose
typical ranges that can ensure the intermittent chaoticity of the
sender and receiver maps.
7FIG. 9: DER vs. {aµ, bµ}, when Aµ = 0.06, Bµ = 1.
FIG. 10: DER vs. {Aµ, Bµ}, when aµ = 27, bµ = 5.5.
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FIG. 11: The decrypted plain-signal mˆt and its relative power
spectrum with the estimated parameters {a˜µ = 27, b˜µ =
5.5, A˜µ = 0.06, B˜µ = 1} in a real attack, when mt =
0.8 sin(2pit/4), δ = 10−8, p = 0.3 and n = 71.
in cryptography [43], the above attacking scenario will
be possible in known/chosen-plaintext attacks. In this
case, it is obvious that one can immediately construct
a return map by plotting the relationship between Kt+1
and Kt. When µ = 5, a = 5, b = 1, A = 0.01, B = 0.2
and p = 0.3 (the default parameters used in [1] and also
used in the above sensitivity analysis), a return map con-
structed from 9,000 samples of Kt is shown in Fig. 12a.
It is clear that the two branches correspond to the fol-
lowing two maps:
Kt+1 = tanh(aµKt +Aµ)− tanh(bµKt), (8)
Kt+1 = tanh(aµKt +Bµ)− tanh(bµKt), (9)
respectively. In fact, with less samples it is still possible
to distinguish the two branches if they are not very close.
Two return maps constructed from 1,000 and 200 samples
of Kt are shown in Figs. 12b and 12c, respectively. Once
the two branches are distinguished, one can choose three
points on each branch to try to numerically solve the
three secret parameters in the corresponding equation.
In [1], it was claimed that numerical solutions of Eqs.
(8) and (9) cannot work well due to the high sensitivity of
the decryption error to the parameters mismatch. Unfor-
tunately, as pointed out above in this paper, the decryp-
tion error is actually not sufficiently sensitive to the pa-
rameter mismatch. As a result, rough estimations of the
secret parameters can work well to generate a keystream
K∗t ≈ Kt for most samples. One can directly get estima-
tions of all the four secret parameters with the following
simple method discussed in [1]:
• Aµ and Bµ: the y-intercepts of the two branches are
K0A = tanh(Aµ) and K
0
B = tanh(Bµ), respectively,
so A˜µ = tanh
−1(K0A) and B˜µ = tanh
−1(K0B);
• bµ: since aµ ≥ 2bµ [1, Sec. II], the tails of
both branches will approach f(x) = 1− tanh(bµx)
quickly as x increases (see Fig. 12a), thus bµ can
be approximately derived from a point (Kt,Kt+1)
lying in the tail: b˜µ ≈ tanh
−1(1 −Kt+1)/Kt;
• aµ: once bµ is approximately known, it is easy
to derive aµ from a point (Kt,Kt+1) lying in
the A-branch, as follows: a˜µ ≈ (tanh
−1(Kt+1 +
tanh(˜bµKt)) − A˜µ)/Kt, or a point (Kt,Kt+1) ly-
ing in the B-branch: a˜µ ≈ (tanh
−1(Kt+1 +
tanh(˜bµKt))− B˜µ)/Kt.
Note that b˜µ, A˜µ and B˜µ depend only on the sampling
points in the return map, and that a˜µ depends on the
estimation of bµ and Bµ. This means that the error prop-
agation only occurs for a˜µ. Since aµ is relatively larger
than the other three parameters, it is less sensitive to
the estimation errors. Based on the only 200 samples
shown in Fig. 12c, the secret parameters are estimated
as follows:
• K0A ≈ 0.05 ⇒ A˜µ = tanh
−1(K0A) ≈
0.05004172927849, and the relative estimation er-
ror is δAµ = |A˜µ −Aµ|/Aµ ≈ 8.346× 10
−4;
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200 samples.
• K0B ≈ 0.7618 ⇒ B˜µ = tanh
−1(K0A) ≈
1.00049031787725, and the relative estimation er-
ror is δBµ = |B˜µ −Bµ|/Bµ ≈ 4.903× 10
−4;
• the point (K3 ≈ 0.7624,K4 ≈ 9.766 × 10
−4)
is used to derive b˜µ ≈ tanh
−1(1 − K4)/K3 ≈
5.00000000000003, and the relative estimation er-
ror is δbµ = |˜bµ − bµ|/bµ ≈ 3× 10
−14;
• the point (K14 ≈ 9.368×10
−4,K15 ≈ 0.0686) lying
in A-branch is used to derive a˜µ ≈ (tanh
−1(K15 +
tanh(˜bµK14)) − A˜µ)/K14 ≈ 24.9554555, and the
relative estimation error is δaµ = |a˜µ − aµ|/aµ ≈
1.782× 10−3.
Recalling the weak sensitivity of the decryption error to
parameter mismatch when p = 0.3, it can be expected
that the above estimation will achieve a rather good de-
cryption performance. Figure 13 gives the decryption re-
sult when mt = 0.8 sin(2pit/4). We have also tested the
decryption performance when mt is a music file (a PCM-
encoded 16-bit wav file with the sampling frequency of
44kHz), where the decrypted plain-signal mˆt is further
enhanced with a low-pass filter. Figure 14 shows the
decryption result, from which one can see that the plain-
music is almost perfectly reconstructed.
Note that only tens of samples may already be enough
for estimating the four parameters. When the number
of samples is too small, the two branches will not be
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FIG. 13: The decrypted signal mˆt and its relative power
spectrum with the estimated parameters, when mt =
0.8 sin(2pit/4), p = 0.3 and n = 71.
clear. Fortunately, one can still tell on which branch some
points (Kt,Kt+1) lie if Kt ≤ 0.1 since in most cases the
two branches separated are sufficiently apart for Kt ∈
[0, 0.1].
Recalling the data shown in Table I, the precision of
the above estimation is good enough for all values of p.
Actually, even when the estimated parameters are not
accurate enough to get an acceptable decryption per-
formance, the attacker can still employ a more sophis-
ticated algorithm to numerically derive the parameters
with a higher precision. In this case, the estimated
values can serve as good initial conditions for the em-
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FIG. 14: The decrypted result with the estimated parameters,
when mt is a music file, p = 0.3 and n = 71 (from top to
bottom: the waveforms of mt, mˆt and the filtered mˆt, and
the relative power spectra of the three signals).
ployed numerical solving algorithm. This implies that
the breaking of the secret parameters from a fragment
of Kt is always possible, independent of the sensitiv-
ity of Kt to the parameter mismatch. In other words,
the key-generation process is always insecure against
known/chosen-plaintext attacks. One can see that this
result agrees with the similar result obtained in the last
subsection – the security of the studied secure commu-
nication scheme is ensured by the encryption function
Ψn(x, y) (not by the chaos-based key-generation process).
Once again, it discourages the use of intermittent chaos
in cryptography.
D. The security of the enhanced key-generation
process against known/chosen-plaintext attacks
In this subsection, we consider the security of the en-
hanced key-generation process proposed in [1] against
known/chosen-plaintext attacks. Assume m (m > 1)
different dynamical systems are used to generate the
keystream Kt: Kt = max
m
k=1
(
zkt
)
, where
zkt+1 = tanh
(
akµz
k
t + u
k
µ
)
− tanh
(
bkµz
k
t
)
. (10)
Apparently, in the enhanced key-generation process, the
number of secret parameters will increase to be 4m and
the return map will be distorted to some extent. Un-
fortunately, it is found that such an enhancement is
not as secure as expected against return-map-based at-
tacks. As an example, let m = 4 and the parameters be
{a1µ, a
2
µ, a
3
µ, a
4
µ} = {7.5, 22.5, 25, 27.5}, {b
1
µ, b
2
µ, b
3
µ, b
4
µ} =
{2.5, 4.5, 5, 5.5}, A1µ = A
2
µ = A
3
µ = A
4
µ = 0.01 and
B1µ = B
2
µ = B
3
µ = B
4
µ = 0.2. The return map from
10,000 samples is plotted in Fig. 15a. Compared with
Fig. 12a, although one cannot find the shape of all
the 8 branches corresponding to 8 different equations,
two of them can still be clearly seen, as shown by dot-
dashed lines (which are local edges of the return map).
Two exposed branches belong to the first dynamical
sub-system: zt+1 = tanh(a
1
µzt + A
1
µ) − tanh(b
1
µzt) and
zt+1 = tanh(a
1
µzt +B
1
µ)− tanh(b
1
µzt). Using the method
discussed above, one can easily get an estimation of the 4
secret parameters {a1µ, b
1
µ, A
1
µ, B
1
µ}. This method can be
further generalized to break even more parameters: the
several dots marked by the arrow actually expose another
branch, zt+1 = tanh(a
2
µzt + A
2
µ) − tanh(b
2
µzt), which be-
longs to the second sub-system and is shown by a dotted
line in Fig. 15a. Since no point is available near the y-
intercept of this branch, the simple estimation method
is disabled, but numerical algorithms can still be used to
get the values of {a2µ, b
2
µ, A
2
µ} by using only three different
points. Now, about half of the secret parameters are bro-
ken with the return-map-based cryptanalysis. Although
it seems very difficult to break other secret parameters
in a similar way, the breaking of partial parameters still
reduces the security of the enhanced key-generation pro-
cess quite significantly.
To frustrate the above partial attack, one may change
Kt = max
m
k=1
(
zkt
)
to other functions. In Fig. 15b, the
return map corresponding to the mean function Kt =
(z1t + z
2
t + z
3
t + z
4
t )/4 is shown. It can be seen that the
return map is further distorted and the edges become
much more ambiguous. However, there are still some
visible curves (marked with arrows) hidden in the noise-
like return map. It is not clear whether or not these
visible curves can be used to break some secret parame-
ters. From a conservative point of view, the risk always
exists, so a good mixing function has to be found to re-
move any visible information in the Kt − Kt+1 return
map. We have tested many simple functions and their
combinations, and found that it really is a difficult task.
Considering the non-uniform distribution of Kt over the
defining interval (see Fig. 3 of [42]), it is guessed that
only iterative chaotic maps with a good mixing property
[45] can smooth the distribution of Kt and then effec-
tively remove the visible curves. In Fig. 15c, the 24-
fold skew-tent map is used to generate the keystream:
Kt = T
24((z1t + z
2
t + z
3
t + z
4
t )/4, 0.3), where
T (x, p) =
{
x/p, 0 ≤ x ≤ p,
(1− x)/(1 − p), p ≤ x ≤ 1.
(11)
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FIG. 15: The return maps constructed from 10,000 samples of Kt in the enhanced key-generation process, when (a) Kt =
max4k=1(z
k
t ), (b) Kt = (z
1
t + z
2
t + z
3
t + z
4
t )/4, (c) Kt = T
24((z1t + z
2
t + z
3
t + z
4
t )/4, 0.3).
One can see that the resulting return map becomes much
more mixed. Although in such a way the key-generation
process can be dramatically enhanced, the enhancement
is caused by the fully-chaotic tent map T (x, p) with a good
mixing feature, not by the two intermittent chaotic sys-
tems themselves. This, for the third time, makes the use
of intermittent chaos in cryptography questionable.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has carefully studied the security of a se-
cure communication scheme published in [1], which is
based on intermittent chaotic systems driven by a com-
mon random signal. It is found that the key space of
the studied scheme can be drastically reduced, and that
the decryption is insensitive to the mismatch of the se-
cret key, which means that the scheme can be easily bro-
ken by inexpensive brute-force attacks. Furthermore, it
has been found that the core of this secure communica-
tion scheme – the key-generation process – is not secure
against known/chosen-plaintext attacks: if an attacker
can get access to a fragment of the generated keystream,
he can easily estimate the secret key with sufficient accu-
racy and thus break the entire cryptosystem. The secu-
rity of an enhanced key-generation process proposed in
[1] has also been discussed. At present, it is still not clear
whether or not the existence of periodic regimes in inter-
mittent chaotic systems always brings negative influence
on the design of secure chaotic cryptosystems. It is an
open problem for future investigations.
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